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  * * * 
Professor Sir Geoffrey Lloyd’s contributions over the past decades to Greek 
intellectual history and the history of science are immense. Moreover, he 
has made remarkable efforts also within the field of comparative Greek/ 
Chinese studies. Having established himself as one of the most prolifically 
productive writers on the classics of Greek and Roman intellectual history 
in a remarkably broad sense, Lloyd has now written extensively also on 
ancient Chinese culture. Together with Nathan Sivin he wrote the very 
ambitious comparative survey of Greek versus Chinese history of science, 
The Way and the Word (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). On his 
own he continued with Ancient Worlds, Modern Reflections (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), and The Delusions of Invulnerability (London: 
Duckworth, 2005). 
All this enables him to view cultural history from an unusually well- 
informed, broadened comparative perspective that includes a refreshing 
detailed interest in matters of natural science. Lloyd’s books are always 
engaging and highly readable. The present work Cognitive Variations: 
Reflections on the Unity and Diversity of the Human Mind (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) is certainly no exception. The questions he lines up 
and addresses with his customary polite erudition and conciliatory intellec-
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tual diplomacy are invariably of more than ephemeral or purely “aca-
demic” interest. 
Take the matter of spatial orientation, finding one’s way. It is common 
knowledge that in Peking one expects to be given objective directions in 
terms of turning north and south, whereas in Canton one certainly expects 
to be told to turn right or left, as the case may be. How exactly does this 
matter, cognitively? This is the book where one is given a splendidly lucid 
introduction to subjects of this order of generality and human relevance. 
(See Stephen C. Levinson, Space in Language and Cognition: Explorations in 
Cognitive Diversity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
Does it matter to our perception of the whale that our language, like 
most others, mistakes it for a fish? How do folk terminologies relate to 
scientific terminologies? What is it, in the first place, that marks out scien-
tific terminologies versus folk terminologies? These are crucial questions 
that Lloyd invites us to ask with healthy intellectual persistence. 
Do we actually tend to feel emotions just because we happen to have a 
name for them? And as a more general point of the ethnography of emo-
tions: do the conceptual repertoires for the emotions have a significant 
impact on our emotional lives? And indeed, while one is at it: would 
people have felt quite as melancholic before Dürer and Robert Burton’s The 
Anatomy of Melancholy? (And also: do children fail to be jealous until they 
learn a word for jealousy?) 
Can we strongly and distinctly feel different emotions without having 
distinct names for them? What is the status of the current notions of 
physical and mental well-being as we take them for granted in our medical 
science and in our medical practice? Are these Western parochialisms 
imposed everywhere together with Coca-Cola, as an integral part of the 
Coca-colonisation of “other” minds? 
Are there such things as universals of self-construal, construals of 
agency, or of causation? Or do we have here contingent structures that 
evolved in Europe while it was in ascendance, and that spread throughout 
the world while Europe still was culturally dominant, now to be ideo-
logically rejected as Europe has become old Europe, degenerate and effete? 
Is the division between realms of Nature and of Culture a cognitive uni-
versal? If not, then why exactly do we feel entitled to apply it everywhere 
as anthropologists? Are all human cultures equally rational, basically? 
What are the diversities of rational behaviour and rational thinking on the 
globe? 
Lloyd’s answers to broad and thoroughly worthwhile questions of this 
order are “Aristotelian” throughout. He sets up the biologistic universalist 
(who focusses on the fact that humans are biologically very much the same, 
across cultures and races) against the culturalistic relativist (who is 
impressed by the observation that everything is culturally contextual and 
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ultimately incommensurable). He does not care very much whether there 
really are neat representatives of any of these extremes. And then, very 
much in the Aristotelian manner, and not surprisingly, Lloyd tends to 
conclude everywhere that such extreme positions are wrong, and that 
sophisticated methodologies are needed to find empirical answers that lie 
appropriately in-between these postulated extremes that no one holds. The 
truth tends in every case to be the empirically disputable golden mean that 
recognises both the need to explore the biological universals, and, at the 
same time, to probe into the depths of cultural variation wherever and 
whenever any of these can be established empirically or philologically. 
Lloyd’s book is a summation of many decades of reflection on the 
problems of de-parochialising and de-occidentalising the study of the 
Greek and Roman classics, and of accommodating in the purview of 
intellectual history other civilisations, especially the abundantly docu-
mented Chinese intellectual and cultural experience. 
What he likes to call the “psychic” unity of mankind is conveniently 
demonstrated by the ability of humans to learn to communicate across 
cultural boundaries, and indeed to learn any language in the first place. We 
are clearly not sufficiently different from each other to prevent us from 
learning each other’s languages everywhere across the globe. The universal 
learnability even of “exotic“ languages is demonstrated particularly well 
by those who explain where these languages are untranslatable: they 
would not know exactly what was untranslatable if they had not been able 
to learn sufficiently much about what is untranslatable in order to diagnose 
that untranslatability. 
Donald Davidson insisted, in conversation, and I believe also some-
where in writing, on the translatablility of everything into English. But 
such translatability (or should we perhaps suggest he should have said 
paraphrasability) is in fact inessential in the present argumentative context. 
From a cognitive science point of view it is learnability that is at issue. 
In Par delà culture et nature (“Beyond Culture and Nature“) (Paris: Gal-
limard, 2005) Philippe Descola manages to elaborate four profoundly 
different ontologies in beautiful French. He does not have to leave the 
French universe of discourse in order to specify these four radically 
incompatible ontologies. These ontologies, to the extent that Descola does 
justice to them, are not sufficiently radically distant and “other” for this 
presentation to have seemed impossible to him. This is not to say that 
French provides an impeccably neutral vantage point on all cultures. But 
French does tend to be able to provide an angle on the profound difference 
between ontologies as described by Descola. 
The question now arises concerning the symmetry of this relation of 
translatability and expressibility, or on the equipollence of human lan-
guages. Michelle Z. Ronaldo, Knowledge and Passion: Ilongot Notions of Self 
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and Social Life (Cambridge: CUP, 1980) does manage to explain painlessly, 
in readable English, what she takes to be some Ilongot ways of thinking. 
But are we to assume that the Ilongot language equips the speakers of 
Ilongot to translate his book into Ilongot, and equally painlessly? It is not 
good enough to answer this question while comfortably seated in one’s 
philosophical theoretical armchair. The experience-based anthropology is 
what we need. See the epilogue by Clifford Geertz, “Making experience, 
authoring selves“, in the important volume of Victor W. Turner and 
Edmund M. Bruner (eds.), The Anthropology of Experience (Urbana and 
Chicago: Indiana University Press, 1986, pp. 373-381). 
Would a modern Chinese translation of Descola or Ronaldo provide a 
completely different Chinese angle on these different ontologies? From 
extensive experience with modern Chinese translations of Western books 
one should think not. But whether Thomas Aquinas Summa theologiae is or 
is not radically untranslatable into classical Chinese is a question that does 
need a careful answer based on close philological analysis and that very 
much remains a philosophical desideratum. 
 
Consider now, just for the sake of argument, the task of translating 
Descola’s work into Shang dynasty oracle bone inscription Chinese (OBI). 
One is sure the deed cannot be done. The vocabulary of OBI Chinese is far 
too limited. The syntactic means provided by the language are far too 
narrowly constrained. The rhetorical devices available are far too restricted. 
The language does seem radically inadequate to the task. 
One may object that OBI is only a limited linguistic code, not really a 
complete language. We do not, in fact, know much about the spoken 
language of Shang times. 
Very well, then. Let us consider the early archaic Chinese language of 
the Book of Songs and the Book of Documents. Here we have a much better 
idea of what may have been sayable Chinese at the time, during the early 
to mid-first millennium BC. But even in this case one feels sure the deed 
still cannot be done. The vocabulary is far too limited, the abstract nature of 
the discourse could not be plausibly reproduced in Early Archaic Chinese. 
The radical changes in the Chinese language that were necessary to 
make Descola’s or Ronaldo’s work translatable were introduced system-
atically during the early twentieth century. It was then that a high degree 
of intertranslatability of the language with English was made possible by a 
radical internationalised anglification of Modern Standard Chinese on the 
basis of Japanese precedents. 
There is not just cognitive diversity, there is a radical asymmetry here of 
cognitive diversity. Languages are not equal. Some are much more equal 
than others. International de-anglicised basic conference koinē English rules 
the day. Hence the asymmetric cultural flow between languages. 
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But from the cognitive science angle, quite properly adopted by Lloyd, 
such interesting issues of the asymmetry of intertranslatability are not in 
fact proof of cognitive variation at all. The essential cognitive assumption is 
that just as we confidently expect an Ilongot child to be able quite naturally 
to learn to read Ronaldo’s book about the Ilongot people in English, so we 
do find it quite conceivable that Ronaldo has learnt enough about Ilongot 
cognitive schemes for his book—if indeed he has taken the philological 
trouble to do so properly. We may in fact also confidently assume that a 
Shang dynasty child, if miraculously transported to the twentieth century 
and to Cambridge, England, would have been able learn to read both Lloyd 
on the Chinese and Ronaldo on the Ilongot. 
One must not confuse the crucial biologically programmed abstract 
cognitive ability to learn (about) something on the one hand, with the 
biologically inessential concrete linguistic ability (for example in Ilingot or 
in English) to articulate this (basically learnable) thing in a natural way. 
When it comes to the linguistic ability to express things naturally and 
easily, cognitive variation changes significantly through the history of a 
given language, and it varies disconcertingly across linguistic cultures. 
Languages are highly unequal with respect to their ability to express 
things. Hence the excessively asymmetric flow of linguistic loans even 
between Greek and Latin, not to speak of French and Russian. Hence also 
the development of Latin from a peasant idiom to a highly sophisticated 
linguistic medium for the expression of abstract thought through conscious 
and systematic emulation of Greek. 
When it comes to the biologically determined cognitive ability to learn 
languages, establishing such variations is much more difficult than estab-
lishing the manifest linguistic abilities: children are biologically able to 
learn literally any language whatsoever, even under the universally pre-
valent conditions of severe stimulus poverty during their childhood.  
The difficulty of distinguishing carefully—and at all times—between 
the cognitive and the linguistic issues of variation has made things very 
difficult within this field of study. 
Lloyd maintains: “The relativist will compare the way in which no one 
natural language can be judged more adequate to communication than any 
other.“ (p. 3) But even stages of the same language differ radically from 
each other, later stages of that very same language having become radically 
more adequate to communication than earlier ones. Old Gothic was, of 
course, a splendid and a very impressive language, but there is no doubt 
that it was less adequate to communication even than Middle High 
German, not to speak of modern German. The German language radically 
increased its expressive power and thereby its adequacy to complex 
communication through borrowings of all kinds from Latin and Greek, not 
to speak of French and later English. The loans were made in the language 
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because the speakers felt they improved German for purposes of commu-
nication where German was felt to be insufficient. But if languages increase 
so manifestly in their expressive power through lexical as well as gram-
matical borrowing (as well as by other autochthonous means and 
indigenous developments) then the relativist is plainly wrong: languages 
differ in expressive power and they are manifestly found to grow by 
emulation as well as by internal autochthonous creative mechanisms. 
Language cannot be a stable determining factor of thought from which 
one cannot escape, if only because language constantly and often very 
effectively, escapes from its indigent predicament through loans as well as 
syntactic emulation of other languages that are sufficiently neatly felt to be 
less indigent on a given point. 
However, such cultural variation is circumscribed by biological com-
monalities. The relativist focusses on that manifest cultural variation. The 
universalist focusses on those equally manifest biological commonalities. 
Plainly, the relativist and the universalist might learn important things 
from each other. Commendably, Lloyd aims to encourage this mutual 
learning process. 
Lloyd’s book is very rich in content, far too rich to allow one to provide 
even a general survey of its wide-ranging content: he covers spatial 
cognition (ch. 2), the natural kinds of animals and plants (ch. 3), the emo-
tions (ch. 4), health and well-being (ch. 5), the self: agency and causation 
(ch. 6), nature versus culture (ch. 7), and reason itself (ch. 8). Let me stay, 
then, with that notoriously controversial issue of colour terminology.  
I can only comment on most issues Lloyd raises as one of those “general 
readers“ lacking the decades of professional endeavour needed to read and 
to judge the vast literature in the fields he covers with such magisterial 
poise and judgment. 
The biological equipment to perceive colour would seem to be pretty 
much identical throughout the healthy and normal human population on 
earth. Colour terminologies can be more or less complex and difficult, but 
we all seem, indeed, reasonably well-equipped to learn each other’s colour 
vocabulary, whatever language we speak. 
But, having said that, do the colour words in the language one has 
learnt make a difference to one’s subjective colour perception? Do you find 
things just as distinctly mauve, purple, crimson or pink without having a 
word for mauve or pink? Do we remember the set of things mauve or pink 
just as well when we do not have a word for mauve or pink? Does the 
presence of a word like “crimson” help in recognising this shade and 
distinguishing it memorably and learnably from purple? Does it really 
make no cognitive difference whether you do or do not have those words 
purple, crimson, and mauve? Is there no cognitive progress in distinct 
colour perception in children as they learn more colour words? Does the 
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learning of such words not add anything to children’s sensitivity or to the 
distinctive variety of colour experience? And if it does not help, cogni-
tively, to learn such words, why do English children traditionally bother 
and waste their time learning them from their elders? Is that learning 
process really cognitively vacuous? 
All these engaging questions arise in splendid clarity as one is reading 
Lloyd’s book. And such issues are fascinating not only from some narrow 
academic point of view. Lloyd’s issues rise above disciplinary boundaries. 
He has written a very engaging and inspiring book for the famous “general 
reader“. 
The subject was felt of interest already by the author of the pseudo-
Aristotelian book On colours, of which Prantl produced a wonderfully 
detailed commented edition that includes a comprehensive survey on 
ancient Greek views and theories on the colours and on colour perception. 
Our reflections, then, on the problem of colours may usefully start out not 
with the famous Berlin and Kay, Basic Color Terms (Berkeley: University of 
Calfornia Press, 1969) as in Lloyd’s book, but actually with pseudo-
Aristotle as presented in Carl Prantl, Aristoteles ueber die Farben: Erläutert 
durch eine Uebersicht der Farbenlehre der Alten (Munich: Christian Kaiser, 
1849) which Lloyd never mentions but surely knows all about. 
Nine years later, in 1858, William Gladstone, Prime Minister as well as 
consummate Homeric scholar, wrote extensively on colour terminology in 
his three volume set Homer (1858, vol. 3, pp. 457-499), and he suggested a 
historical development from luminosity towards hue-proper in colour 
terminology in Greek history.  
William Gladstone is not mentioned in Lloyd’s index and I have not 
found any reference to him in the book, but I find it worthwhile to record 
his views in detail, if only because they seem to me to be much more 
philologically lucid than what I have found in the literature Lloyd does 
discuss: 
I. The paucity of his colours. 
II. The use of the same word to denote not only different hues or 
tints of the same colour, but colours which, according to us, are essen-
tially different. 
III. The description of the same object under epithets of colour 
fundamentally disagreeing one from the other. 
IV. The vast predominance of the most crude and elemental forms of 
colour, black and white, over every other, and the decided tendency to 
treat other colours as simply intermediate modes between these 
extremes. 
V. The slight use of colour in Homer, as compared with other ele-
ments of beauty, for the purpose of poetic effect, and its absence in 
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certain cases where we might confidently expect to find it (vol. III, p. 
458). 
Elsewhere Gladstone summarises, again very lucidly: 
I conclude, then, that the organ of colour and its impres-
sions were but partially developed among the Greeks of 
the heroic age. In lieu of this, Homer seems to have had, 
dirstly some crude conceptions of colour derived from the 
elements; secondly and principally, a system in lieu of 
colour, founded upon light and upon darkness, its 
opposite or negative. (ibid. p. 488) 
I quote Gladstone at such length because in the detail of his work he is 
manifestly trying to understand the challenging specificities of the lan-
guage he is studying rather than to subsume that language under any 
ready-made theoretical categories of his own. This is NOT to suggest that 
Gladstone was a relativist. It is just to acknowledge gratefully that he was a 
careful and thoughtful philosophically-minded philologist. And I am 
disappointed to find that his crucial contribution to the history of colour 
terminology goes unnoticed in Lloyd’s splendidly documented book. 
 
During the rest of the nineteenth century a very considerable literature 
combined a keen interest in cognitive biology with historical philology and 
conceptual history, on which Guy Deutscher, Through the Language Glass: 
Why the World Looks Different in Other Languages (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 2010, pp. 79ff), dwells with such malicious suffisance in his highly 
entertaining book. Pre-Berlin and Kay literature on colour terminology was 
no way as ante-diluvian as post-Berlin and Kay discussion might make one 
believe. 
The question is not whether there is or is not a strictly common bio-
logical physiological base for colour perception and for the making of 
colour terminologies. There surely is. The question is what impact the 
culturally distinct styles of deployment of these biologically determined 
identical faculties have on human experience. 
What we need to try to reconstruct are the patterns in the changing and 
evolving cognitive subjectivities among the peoples of the world. One of 
the issues (focussed on by Berlin and Kay) is whether underlying the 
manifest differences among repertoires of colour terminology one can 
reconstruct a biologically determined invariant underlying pattern in the 
structure and the development of colour terminologies throughout the 
world. This is very much an empirical philological question, which must be 
answered on the basis of cognitive variations between a maximal diversity 
of completely unanglicised linguistic cultures and language speakers. 
Sensitive philological and longue durée historical studies of this sort do not 
abound. Harold Conklin (1955) provides a splendidly sensitive example of 
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such description that we have all too few of, although he has not much 
history to go back to. He reports that the classification of colours among the 
Hununoo of the Philippines is radically different from our own. There are 
four basic colour terms: (a) (ma)lagtiʔ covers English ‘white’, but also all 
other light tints; (b) (ma)biru covers ‘black’, but also dark tints of other 
colours; (c) (ma)raraʔ covers approximately ‘red’, ‘orange’ and ‘maroon’; 
and (d) (ma)latuy? covers the range of ‘yellow’, and light tints of ‘green’ 
and ‘brown’. Furthermore, their classification is based on the wet/dry axis, 
which is different from that of brightness/intensity. 
Lloyd takes as his point of departure the work of Berlin and Kay (1969) 
and the reactions this book provoked. This justly famous study was based 
largely on interviews conducted by non-native speakers of English, in 
English, with westernised informants (many of them students at American 
universities, specifically Berkeley—as reported by Eleonor Rosch of 
Berkeley University). Naturally, such interview arrangements prove 
precious little about those pristine monolinguals talking naturally to each 
other who, from Kant’s point of view and indeed from mine, should have 
held our main interest. 
Such indigenous non-anglicised discourse would give us an idea of 
indigenous subjectivities other than the questions we impose on the 
material by our generalist methodology of questioning. Of particular 
interest will be the metalinguistic perspectives: how do the non-anglicised 
indigenous people define colours for each other (and not: how do they 
translate them into English for the outside investigator). Good colour-term 
ethnography should try to let the non-anglicised native speakers “speak for 
themselves“. 
As Lloyd points out, we need something radically better than anglo-
phone-indigeneous responses to American questionnaires based on com-
mercial American Munsell chips. Preferably, we need to listen very care-
fully to all these “others” (not only the dead Greeks of the past) talking 
among themselves and to themselves about colour and colours, eliciting 
their natural range of “basic colour term” use. We might, then, come to 
understand something of how their different discourses relate to each other 
and to our own, and we might then find out, very slowly, to what extent all 
these discourses fit, or fail to fit, into any general scheme of basic colour 
schemes. And, crucially, we always need to observe colour discourse at a 
stage where it is absolutely above suspicion of any interference whatsoever 
from that now-dominant medium of de-anglicised basic global koinē 
English that defines current academic discourse. Preferably, we should like 
to observe the use of basic colour terminology in a context of longue durée in 
order to see to what extent the lexical developments revealed by historical 
philologists and linguists do or do not conform to any such generalisations 
as those provided in Berlin and Kay (1969). 
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And, leaving aside historical considerations, bilingual anglophone 
informants are not the only ones that must be strictly excluded on the 
subtle matters under investigation here. Even those who have been taught 
by bilingual speakers can be problematic on subtle matters of terminology. 
In a rapidly globalised world our relevant informants are more and more 
difficult to find. Conversely, the informants that do become accessible to us 
are more and more likely to confirm us in our anglocentric preconceived 
categories: fewer and fewer aboriginals we interview will not directly or 
indirectly have been exposed to English or Western discourse on colour. 
The longer we wait for our confirmation of the data, the more likely we are 
to get indirectly westernised confirmation of our Western preconceptions. 
On the Very Concept of “Colour“ 
To start with, one would have to try to find out what distinctions 
unanglicised native speakers of widely varying languages make within the 
general semantic field that in English is populated by such words as 
“colour, hue, shade, tint, tone, coloration, pigmentation, sheen, saturation, 
surface texture, etc.”, and which in French will contain such current items 
as “colorant, coloration, coloris, enluminure, teint, teinte, teinture, ton, tonalité, 
truculence, couleur”. If we are invited to believe that all humans are bio-
logically programmed to separate out hue from saturation, brightness, and 
surface structure as a cognitive dimension, then I should politely decline 
that invitation. It is an empirical question of modern and classical philology 
to determine to what extent cultures do converge on their development of 
“colour terminologies” that would make them strictly comparable to each 
other and to English in particular. It is a manifestly empirical philological, 
question to what extent different languages construe the very concept of 
colour in a sufficiently converging way to enable comparison between 
them. 
The preliminary question to ask in this connection is this: What kinds of 
distinctions do languages make concerning the visual features attributed to 
surfaces? Which languages actually do seem to have a concept of colour 
that is sufficiently similar to our own for us to compare any “basic colour” 
notions? Is the very notion of “colour” a universal in human language, in 
the sense that any human language will have a word that non-misleadingly 
translates into English “colour”? And if they do not, in what sense may we 
attribute notions of “basic colour terms” to them? To them, these cannot be 
“colour” terms because they had no notion of “colour“. So, then, the 
description of their terminology is in our terms, not theirs. This is fine, as a 
methodology. But it does not entitle us to speak of their “basic colour 
terms”, if their very notion of colour radically differs from ours. 
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Homer, for one, certainly is not thought to have had any word that is 
translatable into English as “colour”. And if he didn’t, why should we 
assume that everyone else does? 
 
What is needed is a careful philosophical reconsideration of P. G. Maxwell-
Stuart, Studies in Greek Colour Terminology (2 vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981) 
and also of such meticulous documentation as we have in Elmar Seebold, 
Chronologisches Wörterbuch des deutschen Wortschatzes, Zweiter Band: Der 
Wortschatz des 9. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008). 
So there we are: colour is not a universal concept in the first place. 
Moreover, exactly what it is for a colour term to be basic remains radically 
unclear, as will be seen when one applies the Berlin and Kay definitions to 
the colour vocabulary of ancient Chinese. And the universal notion of what 
might count as a basic colour in any language is even much, much less 
clear, if only because what is and is not going to be judged to be basic by 
non-anglicised native speakers may very much depend on cultural and 
material (pigment-availability-related) factors of colour use that are very 
far from being biologically determined. 
The Greek term chrōs in Aeschylos, as well as the chrōma “colour” that 
figures in pseudo-Aristotle, Peri chrōmatōn “On Colours“ is not Homeric: 
for Homer the closest to colour he had was “complexion of skin”. And it is 
amusing that both yán 顏 and sè 色, which form the current classical and 
modern Chinese binome for “colour“, are semantically related to the 
concept of the face.  
On the Very Notion of Basic Colour Terms 
Let me begin with a very simple philosophical query about the very con-
cept of “colour terms“. From a cognitive science point of view what matters 
is not colour terms, even less colour words. Surely, the primary cognitive 
issue is not terminological. It is conceptual. If a people were found to hap-
pen to have a highly current, complex expression to refer to one of their 
basic colours, that would in fact make strictly no difference to their 
conceptual cognitive system. Berlin and Kay would have to say that they 
do not have a basic colour term, since they have no simplex “monolexemic” 
term. But they would surely have that basic colour concept for which they 
use a complex expression. Berlin and Kay confuse matters of linguistic 
encoding with matters of cognitive construal. 
Whether or not these colour concepts are expressed by simplex words 
like lǜ 綠 “green”, as in classical Chinese, or by complex words like lǜsède 
綠色的 “GREEN COLOUR ‘S>of green colour>green” is conceptually quite 
irrelevant. Whether lǜsède is or is not “monolexemic” is in any case not to 
188                                                                                                 EASTM 36 (2012) 
be judged on the basis of general theories of colour terminology. It is an 
interesting matter of Chinese philology and linguistic analysis. The pri-
mary issue should have been formulated as one not of basic colour 
terminology, but of basic colour concepts. 
John Lyons (1999, p. 44) aims in the right direction when he defines 
level 1 colour words like “red“ as those that are not only highly current, 
but also typically used as hypernyms to explain or define a range of other 
level 2 colour words like “mauve”. Level 2 words like “mauve”, on the 
contrary, are not typically used to define level 1 words like “red”. Here 
speaks a sound philologist and linguist. And what he reports as a 
philologist and linguist does matter to conceptual analysis. It is the 
arduous task of general linguists to see whether there really are no other 
languages that have non-“monolexemic” basic colour terminologies. Berlin 
and Kay invite us to believe that all languages are, in this respect, 
structurally similar to English, and that none use non-monolexemic basic 
colour terms. They would begin to be convincing if they were able to give a 
precise and universally applicable definition of what exactly it is for a word 
to be monolexemic in their definition. 
Paul Kay (1999) writes at the outset of his response to Lyons: 
Berlin and Kay (1969, hereafter BCT) operated with the tacit 
assumption that every language contains a small set of words— 
the basic color terms—each of whose significatum is a color 
concept and whose significata jointly partition the psychological 
color space. 
One notes with dismay that the significata of colour terms are colours, not 
colour concepts. The word “red” does not refer to any concept, and it does 
not have any concept as its significatum. The word “redness” does refer to a 
concept, and it does have that concept as its significatum. I quibble on this, 
because I am convinced that neatness in the logic of semantic analysis is of 
the essence in the matter of the scientific interpretation of colour terms. 
More generally, the insufficiently neat and clear distinction between 
conceptual cognitive science questions on the one hand, and of questions of 
linguistic articulation on the other seems to me to bedevil much of the 
discussion on basic colour concepts. It is as if one studied Begriffsgeschichte 
“conceptual history” as the history of words. And it is needful to repeat the 
commonplace that terminological history is not the same as conceptual 
history. 
According to Berlin and Kay, basic colour terms have to be “mono-
lexemic“. Presumably, this would exclude modern Chinese lǜsè 綠色 
“GREEN COLOUR>green” as a candidate for a basic colour term in 
modern Chinese, while admitting the earlier word lǜ 綠 “GREEN>green” 
as such a candidate. This looks like a thoroughly uncomfortable result of a 
linguistically little-thought-through definition. It turns out that the ancient 
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Chinese did have notions of zhèng sè 正色  “basic colours”, and there 
happens to have been general agreement that there were five of these for 
the last 2500 years. The five basic colours known universally as wǔ sè 五色 
“five colours” are these: 
white 
black 
red 
BRELLORANGE (brown/yellow/orange) 
GRUEY (green/blue/dark-grey) 
Consider the colour huáng 黃 : the term demonstrably refers to things 
brown, things yellow, and things orange. One may also say that it refers to 
things brown, yellow, or orange. But what it designates is neither the 
colour brown, nor the colour yellow, nor indeed the colour orange, since 
they do not have words for any of these. It designates, on the contrary, a 
feature that these three colours are deemed, in that culture, to have in 
common.  
Thus the Chinese “have” neither yellow, nor brown, nor orange. And to 
this day I do not know of any way of referring to any object as being yellow 
in the Chinese language. One may be tempted to say that they “have” the 
colours “green”, “blue” and “dark-grey”, since they have a word to refer to 
these. This is tempting if one wishes to arrive at general statements, and if 
moreover one presupposes that our categories “green”, “blue”, and “dark-
grey” are the biologically universal ones in which the ancient Chinese think 
when they identify something as being qīng 青. But there is no evidence 
whatsoever that the ancient Chinese do anything of the kind. Ancient 
Chinese uses of qīng 青 and their ways of glossing the word show that qīng 
青  refers to what is construed as one colour qīng 青 , and not as an 
ambiguous word for many specifiable other (basic) colours. In this 
empirical matter I much prefer to trust the judgments available in the 2000-
year-old Chinese lexicographic and commentarial literature rather than to 
generalising theoreticians of colour terminology. 
Archaeology supplies important evidence on distinct pigments: Cheng 
Te-k’un (1965) studied a group of fifteen pigment containers assigned to 
the late Shang and early Zhou period. In three out of the fifteen containers, 
he found deposits of white, black, red and green powder pigments. Does 
this by itself demonstrate that the Chinese “had” a basic or non-basic 
colour term “green”? I should think not. In order to establish this we would 
need to look for philological evidence to show that they did have the 
relevant terminology referring to green and only to green things. 
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Also, from an egyptological point of view, a significant contribution was 
made by John Baines (1985), where the importance of material culture and 
indeed the pragmatic cultural context in a society for the conceptualisation 
of colours is rightly stressed. 
Turning now to the case of Chinese colour terminology in general, 
Zhāng Yǒngyán 張永言 (1992) has collected a large number of words that 
would be classified as subtypes of these five colours, but the interesting 
point is that the ancient Chinese from the fourth century BC onwards were 
not in any doubt what the names of the basic colours were: bái 白, hēi 黑, chì 
赤, qīng 青, huáng 黃. What these terms are terms for is very much a 
philological question on which it is a theoretical circulus vitiosus, indeed 
something of an academic circus vitiosus, to impose theoretical abstract 
preconceptions on what colour is and what basic colour terminology ought 
to be. 
The proliferation of words that are defined as kinds of “black“ and 
kinds of “white“ in ancient Chinese is quite extraordinary: Zhāng Yǒngyán 
lines up and distinguishes 98 words under hēi 黑 “black” and 85 words 
under bái 白 “white”. The interesting point here is that the vast majority of 
the words in these two “synonym groups” are explicitly glossed by the use 
of 白 and 黑 respectively. Thus, in these two cases the evidence is rich but 
fairly neat. 
Consider now our category “red”. Zhāng Yǒngyán discusses and distin-
guishes between 65 words under the general category “red”. Fǔ Huáiqīng 
符淮青 (1996) analyses more closely 32 words mostly limited to words 
attested in the Shuōwén 說文  graphological dictionary of AD 100. The 
unanimous choice of chì 赤 as the “basic colour term” for “red” in ancient 
Chinese throughout premodern Chinese history is particularly interesting 
in this case because there is also the word zhū 朱 “deep red”, which has no 
particular links with any red objects and is in common use. The interesting 
thing is that whereas 赤 is typically defined or glossed— if at all—as the 
colour made (for example) by the rising sun, zhū 朱 is typically defined as a 
“deep/saturated” kind of chì 赤 . Thus, the glossing traditions tend to 
respect the idea that among the many dozens of words for “red” there is 
one that is basic, and that tends to be used to define the rest as a kind of 
hypernym. And one is not surprised to learn that dān 丹  “cinnabar”, 
although quite common as a colour word, is not regarded by the Chinese as 
a zhèng sè 正色 “basic colour”. Nor is one in any way disorientated by the 
fact that the standard modern word hóng 紅 “red”, since it anciently refers 
to the pink of silk, would not be a strong candidate for a “basic colour red“ 
by the ancient Chinese. (It is amusingly arguable, incidentally, that the 
Dream of the Pink Chamber is radically misunderstood in most Western 
translations even in the eighteenth century. The Chinese would seem 
considerably more romantic than the English translation…). 
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So far, so good, then. But consider now the very old Chinese word cāng 
蒼 “pale blue (as of the sky)” already attested in the Book of Odes, which 
remained common in the combination cāng tiān 蒼天 “blue/steely-blue/ 
azure sky“. But the colour “bright blue” won from the indigo plant was 
definitely not called cāng 蒼, but qīng 青 “GRUEY“. The trouble is that the 
Chinese do appear to have had something very much like a notion of 
“basic colours” under which all other colours are subsumed, but what 
struck them unanimously as the remaining two basic colour terms do not 
correspond to anything very clear in the Berkeley questionnaire setup: 
blue, for example, is out. By calling something huáng 黃 BRELLORANGE 
they neither provide any evidence that they “have” a basic colour “yellow” 
nor that they “have” a basic colour “brown”. 
Now, to say that the ancient Chinese “have” the basic colour “blue”, 
when they do not treat this colour as basic in their own cognitive system, is 
perfectly possible, if we wish to impose our basic colour terminology on 
theirs. Such indifference to indigenous cognitive systems will certainly lead 
to much neater generalisations on the cognitive anthropology of colour 
terms. However, this academic success comes at the significant cost of 
disregarding well-articulated autochthonous subjectivities. 
 
We must insist: huáng 黃 BRELLORANGE is not conceived as ambiguous 
between “brown” and “yellow”, but identifies a feature that these two 
“English colours” have in common, just as, conversely, goluboi and sinii do 
not in fact refer to one colour “blue” with different degrees of saturation, 
but are conceived in Russian as two separate colours that have no current 
hypernym meanings anything like the English “blue”. In an important 
technical sense, the Russians, then, have no notion of blue. And as far as I 
have understood the literature on this well-rehearsed observation of 
Russian usage of “blue” terminology, this has never been explained with 
any logical rigour within the apologetic framework in support of the Berlin 
and Kay system. 
The more self-assertive indifference the conceptual analysis of basic 
colour terms displays to indigenous (for example classical Chinese) ana-
lytic discourse on colour terms and basic colours, the more patently cir-
cular it would seem to become. 
I most gratefully acknowledge the tremendous inspiration it has been 
for me to read Lloyd’s book so as to enter the crucial matters of cognitive 
ethnography that he discusses with such magisterial poise. I am neither a 
scientist, nor a biologist, nor indeed a professional specialist in the cogni-
tive sciences. For a humble reader of that kind, Lloyd’s survey is certainly 
of singular usefulness, if only because it inspires and encourages one in the 
difficult task of finding sound arguments to pursue his issues further from 
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a logical and comparatist philological point of view. As the following list of 
reference indicates: Es ist ein weites Feld. 
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